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 Charkaoui and Secret Evidence  
Gus Van Harten* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its decision in Charkaoui,1 the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
the process under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act2 — by 
which permanent residents and foreign nationals could be detained 
following their designation by the executive as inadmissible to Canada 
on security grounds, subject to review by a judge of the Federal Court — 
was unconstitutional. In its reasons,3 the Court found that this process 
impaired the individual’s right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and that this did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice as 
required under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.4 The Court concluded in particular that the Act’s provision 
for a judge to review secret evidence5 put forward by the executive to 
justify its designation and detention of the individual in question did not 
ensure a fair hearing because the absence of the individual from the 
proceeding undermined the judge’s ability to come to a decision based 
on all the relevant facts and law, while the judge lacked the full and 
independent powers to gather evidence that exist in an inquisitorial 
process, and because the individual’s right to know the case to meet had 
                                                                                                             
*
  Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, and former legal 
advisor to the commissioner of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Maher Arar. All views expressed and errors made in this article are those of the author. 
1
  Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”]. 
2
  S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
3
  I refer to the reasons as those of the Court although the unanimous judgment was 
delivered by McLachlin C.J.C. 
4  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Although not the subject of this article, the Court also concluded 
that the process subjected foreign nationals who are not permanent residents to arbitrary detention 
because it denied them a prompt hearing (in violation of s. 9 and s. 10(c) of the Charter and not 
saved under s. 1) and to address this the Court extended to foreign nationals the same access to 
adjudicative review as provided to permanent residents. 
5
  “Secret evidence” is the author’s term, not the Court’s, and it refers to evidence to which 
the individual (and the public) is denied access; “closed proceedings” means adjudicative 
proceedings that permit secret evidence. 
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been “effectively gutted”.6 Further, this infringement of section 7 was 
not justified under section 1 because the process did not provide for 
alternative procedural mechanisms to accommodate the use of secret 
evidence, such as the appointment of a separate counsel (as in the case of 
the Security Intelligence Review Committee or the Arar Inquiry) or 
special advocate (as in the United Kingdom) to represent the individual’s 
interests and challenge the state’s claims in closed proceedings. Thus, 
the Court struck down the existing review process and its reliance on a 
judge alone as the sole check on the executive in closed proceedings.7 
At the core of Charkaoui is the Court’s confrontation with the 
dilemmas of secret evidence. The use of secret evidence threatens to 
erode the integrity of adjudicative decision-making in at least three 
ways. First, it increases the risk of error and injustice to the individual. 
Second, it undermines confidence in the administration of justice. Third, 
it dilutes the effectiveness of adjudication as a check against abuse of 
state power. In each of these respects, secret evidence contradicts a core 
goal and value of adjudication and, for this reason, courts must be 
steadfast in refusing to allow it where the encroachment on accuracy and 
fairness goes too far. In some adjudicative contexts, above all in criminal 
trials, dangers arising from the use of secret evidence cannot be 
remedied by procedural adaptation.8 On the other hand, the conflict of 
interest in hidden government9 also calls for judges and other 
adjudicators to review actively a range of executive decisions that rely 
on confidential information and that affect the rights or interests of an 
individual. In some areas outside the criminal context, such as 
government decisions to deny a request for access to privileged 
information or to authorize a search warrant or to deny security 
clearance to a person, the limitations arising from secrecy are necessary 
or even desirable because, without them, independent review of the 
executive would be impossible. For this reason, it is appropriate for these 
                                                                                                             
6
  Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at paras. 50 and 63-65. 
7
  Id., at para. 34. 
8
  U.K., Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 
Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention (2005-06 H.L. 240, H.C. 1576), at para. 105. 
9
  M. Rankin, “National Security: Information, Accountability, and the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 249, at 252; E.K. Yamamoto, “White (House) Lies: Why 
the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for National Security 
Abuses” (2004) 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 285, at 288-89 and 315-16; Note, “The National 
Security Interest and Civil Liberties” (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, at 1219 [hereinafter “Note, 
‘The National Security Interest’”]. 
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limitations to be ameliorated, to the greatest extent possible, by 
adaptation of the adjudicative process. 
In cases of immigration-based detention — the subject of Charkaoui 
— secret evidence is used to justify long-term incarceration of the 
individual, thus involving a clear deprivation of personal liberty. Given 
the context, one would expect the Court to elaborate in clear terms the 
limitations presented by secret evidence and to take a strong position 
against its use. In a number of respects the Court did just that. However, 
in other respects, its reasons are open to criticism. Although the Court 
clearly recognized and sought to address limitations that arise from the 
absence of the individual from closed proceedings, its reasons do not 
convey sufficient concern for other weaknesses arising from secret 
evidence, in particular: (1) the dependency of the judge and special 
advocates on the executive for access to the full record that underlies the 
secret evidence presented to the Court; and (2) the pre-eminence of the 
executive’s institutionalized expertise in matters of national security 
confidentiality. This argument is presented via a broader examination of 
the limitations that characterize adjudication when secret evidence is 
permitted, which serves as a platform for evaluating the Court’s 
identification of both the limitations and the procedural mechanisms that 
might ameliorate them. The argument leads to the conclusion that a more 
comprehensive consideration of the limitations arising from secret 
evidence calls not only for surrogate representation of the individual in 
closed proceedings but also for the provision of both independent 
expertise and an independent investigative capacity to enable more 
effective scrutiny of the executive by judges and special advocates alike. 
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF ADJUDICATIVE DECISION-MAKING IN 
CLOSED PROCEEDINGS 
Courts face various obstacles when confronted with secret evidence. 
In this article they are organized into four categories. The first includes 
those limitations arising from the denial of access by the individual to 
the evidence that is advanced by the state, and the corresponding 
inability of the judge to hear information and argument that can be put 
forward only if the individual is made aware of that evidence. The 
second category, similar to the first, includes limitations arising from the 
absence of the public from the proceeding and the inability of the court 
to hear facts and expertise that can be made available only by involving 
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persons who are not directly affected by the proceedings. The third 
category arises from the courts’ special reliance on the executive, often 
including foreign governments, to supply and characterize confidential 
information and to justify the case for secrecy. Fourth is the dynamic of 
closed proceedings in the security context and its potential to influence 
judges to favour unduly the interests of secrecy and security over the 
demands of the adjudicative process for accurate and fair decision-
making. Each of these categories is discussed in this section with 
reference to the Court’s reasons in Charkaoui. 
1. The Absence of the Individual 
The first area of limitations in closed proceedings arises from the 
inability of the individual to present a reply to claims against him or her 
by probing or elaborating on the record and by disputing the state’s 
factual and legal claims.10 The absence of the individual means that 
hallmarks of the adversarial process are “rendered impotent”.11 The court 
is deprived of the fruits of an independent, self-interested investigation 
in response to that of the executive.12 It will not hear exculpatory 
evidence that the individual alone can provide or uncover and the state’s 
witnesses will escape the disciplines of cross-examination by the other 
side.13 In terms of legal argument, the court will not hear the individual’s 
perspective, properly informed, on issues such as the validity of the 
state’s confidentiality claims, the admissibility of secret evidence, the 
appropriate weight to give to the evidence, and so on.14 As a result, 
                                                                                                             
10
  Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya, [1962] A.C. 322, at 337 (P.C.), Lord 
Denning; Engel v. The Netherlands (1976), 22 E.C.H.R. (Ser A), 27 E.H.R.R. 647, at para. 91; 
Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 54. Note, “Secret Evidence in the War on Terror” (2005) 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 1962, at 1973-75 [hereinafter “Note, ‘Secret Evidence’”]. 
11
  Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, at 413 (D.N.J. 1999). E. Yaroshefsky, “Secret 
Evidence is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in the Courts” (2006) 34 
Hofstra L. Rev. 1063, at 1066 and 1071 [hereinafter “Yaroshefsky”]. 
12
  Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 50. J.K. Hugessen, “Watching the Watchers: 
Democratic Oversight” (Paper presented to the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice’s 
conference on Terrorism, Law and Democracy: How is Canada changing following September 11?, 
March 25-26, 2002) at 384-85 [hereinafter “Hugessen”]. Council of Europe, Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Report by Mr. Alvaro-Gil Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, On His Visit to 
the United Kingdom 4th-12th November 2004, Comm.D.H. (2005) 6 (8 January 2005), at para. 21. 
13
  United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 339 U.S. 537, at 551 (1950) (Jackson J., 
dissenting). Yaroshefsky, supra, note 11, at 1075 (highlighting the common law belief in cross-
examination as “the engine that drives the trial process”). 
14
  Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 52; Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, at 823-25 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). Yaroshefsky, id., at 1071. 
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essential safeguards of the adversarial process for ensuring the accuracy 
and completeness of adjudicative decision-making are lost. 
Faced with these constraints arising from the absence of the 
individual, the judge in a closed hearing must attempt to challenge 
directly the executive’s case on behalf of the individual.15 Thus, the 
judge must think both as arbiter and as litigant in the review of the 
written record, the questioning of state witnesses, and the search for 
additional evidence that benefits the individual. At each stage of the 
process, however, the judge will be less able than counsel would be, in 
representing the individual, for two reasons. First, the judge has no 
access to information that the individual would otherwise share with his 
or her counsel in privileged discussions about how to prepare for and 
present the case.16 The judge may not hear whether the accused benefits 
from an alibi at a key time or whether there is an innocent explanation 
for allegedly suspicious behaviour, for example.17 Second, unlike the 
individual’s counsel, the judge must exercise restraint when probing the 
evidence and argument of the executive in order to protect the court’s 
neutrality. A judge can compensate for this — by questioning the state’s 
witnesses aggressively, for example — only at risk of undermining his 
or her position as ultimate decision-maker. As “the only person in the 
justice system whose sole obligation and loyalty is to the defendant”,18 
an individual’s own counsel is the only actor in the process whose duty 
is to focus completely on advocacy for the individual. 
These limitations of closed proceedings were identified and 
elaborated by the Court in Charkaoui. In its discussion of what the 
principles of fundamental justice require in cases where section 7 is 
engaged, the Court found that closed proceedings precluded an impartial 
and independent magistrate, here the Federal Court judge, from making 
a decision based on all the facts and law. The Court stated that in a 
closed proceeding “the named person may be deprived of access to some 
or all of the information put against him or her, which would deny the 
person the ability to know the case to meet” and that as a result “the 
                                                                                                             
15
  P. Duff, “Disclosure of Evidence and Public Interest Immunity” (2007) 10 Scots L. 
Times 63, at 66. 
16
  Hugessen, supra, note 12, at 384. 
17
  American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, at 1069 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
18
  J.L. Dratel, “Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security 
Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case” (2003) 2 Cardozo Pub. L., Policy & Ethics J. 81, at 81 
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter “Dratel”]. 
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named person may not be in a position to contradict errors, identify 
omissions, challenge the credibility of informants or refute false 
allegations”.19 In turn, the Court stated that the judge’s decision may not 
be based on all the relevant facts and, in terms of legal argument, that: 
“Similar concerns arise with respect to the requirement that the decision 
be based on the law. Without knowledge of the information put against 
him or her, the named person may not be in a position to raise legal 
objections relating to the evidence, or to develop legal arguments based 
on the evidence.”20 Finally, the Court recognized that a judge, sitting 
alone in a closed proceeding, “simply cannot fulfill the vacuum left by 
the removal of the traditional guarantees of a fair hearing” because the 
judge “is … not in a position to compensate for the lack of informed 
scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar with the 
case could bring”.21 
The Court thus made clear that the individual’s inability to access 
secret evidence prevented the judge from reaching a properly informed 
decision and that this was inconsistent with the requirement for a fair 
hearing consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. In light of 
this conclusion, the Court went on to discuss how the process of a closed 
hearing might be adapted in ways that would allow the state to rely on 
secret evidence in order to justify long-term detention, while also 
satisfying the minimal impairment standard under section 1 of the 
Charter. In its discussion of alternative procedural approaches, the Court 
mentioned several alternatives to represent more effectively the 
individual’s interests in closed proceedings, including use of the United 
Kingdom’s model of appointing a special advocate (described by the 
Court as “an independent agent at the stage of judicial review to better 
protect the named person’s interests”)22 or certain Canadian models 
including reliance on counsel to the Security Intelligence Review 
Committee or on amicus curiae (and commission counsel, presumably) 
to the Arar Inquiry. The Court did not endorse a specific alternative, 
describing the ones it listed only as “less intrusive alternatives” and as 
mechanisms that “illustrate that the government can do more to protect 
the individual while keeping critical information confidential”.23 
                                                                                                             
19
  Charkaoui, supra, note 11, at para. 54. 
20
  Id., at para. 52. 
21
  Id., at paras. 63 and 64, respectively. 
22
  Id., at para. 3. 
23
  Id., at paras. 70 and 87. 
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The Government of Canada’s response to Charkaoui, however, was 
to adopt in Bill C-3 the alternative of a special advocates regime,24 
leading naturally to the question whether special advocates can fill the 
gaps that are left in closed proceedings because of the absence of the 
individual. Undoubtedly, it is preferable that a special advocate be 
appointed than a judge left alone in the effort to compensate for the 
individual’s absence. In particular, the special advocate is well-
positioned to advance legal argument from the individual’s perspective 
(although he or she remains hampered by the inability to seek specific 
instructions). They can also provide independent cross-examination of 
the state’s case alongside the necessarily more circumspect scrutiny 
exercisable by the judge. Yet it is important to clarify why special 
advocates, like judges, cannot fulfil the ordinary role of counsel in an 
adversarial process.25 They are unable to hear information, known only 
to the individual, that may exonerate the individual or otherwise weaken 
the state’s case. Potential witnesses may not be contacted, important 
documents may not be uncovered and the individual’s own investigation 
of the case will be limited to material disclosed by the government.26 The 
individual will be “unable to explain himself … and assist in his own 
defence” meaning that the surrogate counsel “cannot effectively use the 
evidence by asking her client questions pertaining to the evidence”.27 In 
light of this limitation, it is an open question whether the appointment of 
special advocates will satisfy the minimal impairment requirement under 
section 1 with respect to limitations that arise from the absence of the 
individual, not to mention other limitations of closed proceedings which 
special advocates are not well positioned to address, as discussed below. 
Ultimately, the special advocate is but another layer of procedural 
                                                                                                             
24  Bill C-3, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and 
special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3. For an 
analysis of Bill C-3, see D. Dunbar & S. Nesbitt, “Parliament’s Response to Charkaoui: Bill C-3 
and the Special Advocate Regime under IRPA” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 415 [hereinafter “Dunbar & 
Nesbitt”]. 
25
  Re MB, [2007] U.K.H.L. 46, at para. 35 (U.K.H.L.) (Lord Bingham). U.K., H.C. 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates, 7th Report, Sess. 2004-05, vol. 1, at 55 [hereinafter 
“Constitutional Affairs Committee”]; N. Blake et al., Letter, The Times, February 7, 2004 
[hereinafter “Blake et al.”]. 
26
  Yaroshefsky, supra, note 11, at 1073-74; Dratel, supra, note 18, at 90. 
27
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, at 168 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting oral argument 
by Mr. Hamdan’s counsel). N.W. Smith, “Evidence and Confrontations in the President’s Military 
Commissions” (2005) 33 Hastings Const. L.Q. 83, at 92. 
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construction built upon a process that remains limited for other reasons 
related to secret evidence. 
2. The Absence of the Public 
The second category of limitations arises from the obvious point that 
the general public has no access to closed proceedings. The absence of 
the public raises concerns, not only for the accountability of the state to 
the electorate (an issue which is assumed here to be outweighed by the 
security interest) but also more directly for the adjudicative process. 
First, as in the case of the individual’s absence, keeping the evidence 
secret means that third parties who have relevant information, but who 
can come forward only if they are made aware of the evidence, cannot 
do so. They will not hear about the case from the individual, from the 
media, or otherwise, and this poses the risk, beyond that in open 
proceedings, that the adjudicative decision will be founded on an 
incomplete or inaccurate record. Revealing the evidence to a 
representative of the individual (or even to the individual directly) on 
condition of confidentiality does not permit third parties to be uncovered 
by follow-up investigation or to come forward of their own accord. 
Second, the absence of the public interferes with the judge’s ability 
to look behind the state’s case and its reasons for secrecy. The necessity 
of systematic secrecy in matters of national security necessarily means 
that courts are less able to hear from independent experts, for the simple 
reason that very few people outside of government can develop 
sophisticated and specifically informed expertise in the field, even if 
they were permitted to comment on the evidence and the rationales for 
secrecy that are put forward in a closed proceeding. The executive 
becomes by default the judge’s guide to the exotic world of security and 
intelligence and it is tasked, as such, with the critical function of 
outlining the state’s security priorities, the details of its information-
sharing practices, the motivations of foreign governments, the strengths 
and weaknesses of investigative techniques, and so on. Of course, there 
are experts in the field who may be retired from the security agencies or 
otherwise in a position to offer expertise that is credible because it is 
informed by years of exposure to the technical subject matter. That said, 
such experts may be tainted by past connections to government and, 
where they are not, it remains the case that the pool of experts from 
which to draw persons who can counter the expert evidence of the state 
is much smaller than for matters dealt with commonly in open 
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proceedings. This of course does not mean that sensitive information 
should be released in order to support the development of a wider base 
of expertise in the field. It simply constitutes another factor for the courts 
to consider in deciding whether it is right to allow the use of secret 
evidence and, if so, to adopt measures oriented to ameliorating the 
corresponding limitations. 
Lastly, when proceedings are closed and when they are known by 
the participants to be very likely to remain closed for the long term, the 
discipline that openness otherwise delivers is eroded. Ultimately, 
openness is central to the legal process because it impels everyone 
involved, including the judge, to be aware that their arguments and 
reasoning can be read and picked apart by anyone, so that they will more 
assuredly consider the implications of what they do or decide for their 
reputation and for that of the system. In closed proceedings, the 
executive may be tempted to adopt positions that de-emphasize the 
rights or interests of individuals, or that presents the facts or law in ways 
that would not be feasible in an open proceeding, for reasons of 
openness. And, where an adjudicator or adjudicative tribunal is 
otherwise perceived (rightly or wrongly) as predisposed to favour the 
state’s interests, closure of the proceedings will accentuate the challenge 
to public confidence in the process. Bentham described publicity as “the 
very soul of justice … the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all 
guards against improbity”28 and there is likewise no surer spark for 
cynicism about public decision-making than the knowledge that those in 
power can lawfully conceal what they do from outside scrutiny.29 It is for 
this reason that allowances for secrecy require rigorous mechanisms of 
accountability and, where the risk of error or abuse is too great, for the 
outright prohibition of secret evidence. 
In Charkaoui, the Court does not discuss overtly these issues arising 
from the absence of the public, although it is arguably inherent in the 
Court’s finding that closed proceedings deny the judge access to relevant 
facts and law. Also, it is perhaps understandable that the Court would 
not discuss in detail these concerns given that the Court’s decision to 
allow closed proceedings, with sufficient safeguards, where a section 7 
right is engaged carries with it the implication that the absence of the 
                                                                                                             
28
  J. Bentham, “Draught of a New Plan for the Organization of the Judicial Establishment 
in France” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 4 (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843), at 316.  
29
  Note, “Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security Information” 
(1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 906, at 910-14. 
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public is not a sufficient reason in itself to bar the use of secret evidence. 
The Court clearly sees a role for secret evidence where required in the 
security interest to satisfy “the imperative of the protection of society”.30 
Yet the absence of the public should not be ignored from a section 7 
perspective given the central role of openness in advancing the claims of 
adjudication to accuracy and fairness. It is a necessary feature of the 
individual’s absence that his or her own investigation of the state’s case 
— which might otherwise identify members of the public of whose 
testimony the court should be made aware — cannot happen. However, 
special advocates are likewise precluded from canvassing third parties 
for relevant information, whereas some of the other alternatives 
canvassed by the Court in Charkaoui, including SIRC and commissions 
of inquiry, could address these concerns to a greater degree because of 
their access to a more established repository of information and general 
expertise on matters of security confidentiality, whether by tapping their 
internal expertise (in the case of SIRC) or outside sources (in the case of 
an inquiry). As with the absence of the individual, the limitations 
following from the absence of the public cannot be rectified completely, 
but they can be minimized to a greater extent than by the appointment of 
special advocates. 
3. The Dependence on the Executive  
The third category follows from the special dependency of the 
adjudicative process on the executive in closed proceedings. The court 
depends on the executive, and above all its security arm, to be fair and 
forthcoming in supplying confidential information, in depicting how the 
information was acquired and vetted, and in producing additional 
information that is in the state’s custody and that may be beneficial to 
the individual. There are cases in which the courts’ trust on these matters 
has been betrayed.31 For example, in the aftermath of the Arar Inquiry, it 
                                                                                                             
30
  Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 61. 
31  Dratel, supra, note 18, at 100; M. Scaperlanda, “Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process 
and Secret Deportation Proceedings” (1996) Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 23, at 28; D. Cole, “Enemy 
Aliens” (2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953, at 1001-02; S.M. Akram & K.R. Johnson, “Race, Civil Rights, 
and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims” (2002) 58 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 295, at 324-25; N.T. Saito, “The Enduring Effect of the Chinese 
Exclusion Cases: The ‘Plenary Power’ Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights” (2003) 
10 Asian L.J. 13, at 19-20; Note, “Secret Evidence”, supra, note 10, at 1979-80; J. Lu, “How Terror 
Changed Justice: A Call to Reform Safeguards That Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct” 
(2006) 14 J. L. & Policy 377, at 379-80. 
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was revealed that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had misled a court 
on the likelihood that secret evidence obtained from Syrian military 
intelligence, and used to support an application by police for a warrant, 
was the product of torture.32 This was disclosed to the public only after 
the Inquiry litigated the issue and obtained a Federal Court ruling that 
authorized disclosure, over the objections of the federal government, 
which had blocked disclosure for more than two years on security 
grounds. Judging from this experience, it can be surmised that, where an 
executive agency has misled a court about the reliability of secret 
evidence, the truth is unlikely to emerge without concerted pressure by 
an independent force. Without independent review of specific cases of 
possible misrepresentation by the executive, it is difficult for those on 
the outside, including the courts, to know how widespread and how 
serious the misuse of secrecy powers may be.33 
Yet one need not suspect that security officials have actively misled 
a judge in a particular case in order to accept that judicial review of the 
executive in the national security context is shaped by how officials 
present their activities and how they vet the information they have 
collected before putting it before the court, and by their own 
vulnerability to errors that open proceedings would be likely to uncover 
or prevent.34 Even where officials act in good faith in the identification 
and characterization of security concerns, they are more likely than not 
to favour maintaining secrecy and guarding security.35 However, the 
integrity of adjudicative decision-making depends on the assurance that, 
if an official succumbs to the temptation to spin or vet evidence in a way 
that is misleading, there are ways for this to be detected. The one-sided 
nature of closed hearings dilutes such assurances because, as discussed, 
                                                                                                             
32
  Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar, 
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar — Addendum — Disclosure of information authorized 
by the Federal Court of Canada in accordance with Sections 38.04 and 38.06 of the Canada 
Evidence Act (Ottawa: 2007), at 127-28. See also e.g., United States v. Moussaoui (No. Crim. 01-
455-A), 2002 W.L. 1311718 (E.D. Va., April 17, 2002); United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 
676, at 679, n. 3 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
33
  The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court recently condemned the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for giving false or misleading evidence in 75 security warrant cases under 
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neither the individual in question nor the public can comment on the 
state’s claims. In closed hearings, the only experts (whether legal or non-
legal) who are present in the room are persons with exclusive access to 
and control over the information under consideration, and thus an 
incomparably specialized expertise in the most arcane of fields.36 Where 
a judge is not swayed by “nightmarish tales of national security 
problems”,37 he or she will face much difficulty peeling away any layers 
of obfuscation or uncovering any subtle bending of the truth on the part 
of the executive.  
This is illustrated by the case of informer evidence. Information 
from human sources must be assessed not just in terms of the informer’s 
reliability — whether he or she has invented a story because of a grudge 
or an interest to avoid prosecution or deportation38 — but also in light of 
other information held by the state that undermines the informer’s 
credibility. To carry out such an assessment in a closed proceeding, the 
judge must hear about the circumstances of the informer’s relationship 
with police or security agents, the accuracy of information supplied in 
the past, information from other sources that supports or undermines the 
informer’s account, and so on. The judge relies entirely on the executive 
to be forthcoming on these questions. Moreover, in some instances, the 
executive itself will not be in a position to provide reliable answers, even 
where it is intent on doing so, where for example the agency does not 
itself have a significant relationship with the informer, he or she being 
located abroad, or where the informer is passing on information heard 
from other sources with which the agency has no contact at all. 
Limitations arising from a special dependency on the executive are 
recognized by the Court in Charkaoui, if somewhat tangentially. For 
example, this concern is probably implicit in the following statement by 
the Court (also excerpted above): 
The judge … simply cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the 
traditional guarantees of a fair hearing. The judge sees only what the 
ministers put before him or her. The judge, knowing nothing else 
about the case, is not in a position to identify errors, find omissions 
or assess the credibility and truthfulness of the information in the 
way the named person would be.  
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Likewise, the judge is described by the Court as being “placed in the 
situation of asking questions and ultimately deciding the issues on the 
basis of incomplete and potentially unreliable information”.  
What is not clear in the Court’s reasoning, however, is whether it 
speaks in these passages of the dependency of the judge as caused 
simply by the absence of the individual or whether it speaks more 
generally of the special vulnerabilities of courts to executive manipulation 
where secret evidence is allowed, vulnerabilities which may or may not 
be removed by alternative mechanisms that aim to substitute for the 
individual’s absence but that do not necessarily address the wider 
dependency. 
In its reasons, the Court intertwined dependency on the executive 
with the absence of the individual although, as argued here, these may be 
regarded as separate concerns. For example, in this statement, the Court 
may be read as having merged the two sets of limitations: 
The judge is not afforded the power to independently investigate all 
relevant facts that true inquisitorial judges enjoy. At the same time, 
since the named person is not given a full picture of the case to meet, 
the judge cannot rely on the parties to present missing evidence. The 
result is that, at the end of the day, one cannot be sure that the judge 
has been exposed to the whole factual picture.39 
Again, it is unclear whether the Court’s lack of confidence as to 
whether the judge “has been exposed to the whole factual picture” arises 
from the individual’s absence alone or from the judge’s inability to 
investigate the underlying informational base of the case as in a 
genuinely inquisitorial process. One possible reading of Charkaoui is 
that the demands of minimal impairment will be satisfied if the concerns 
arising from the absence of the individual are adequately addressed, 
regardless of related concerns arising from a wider dependency on the 
executive. 
On the other hand, there are suggestions in some parts of the Court’s 
reasons of a greater concern about dependency beyond that conveyed by 
the Charkaoui decision as a whole. This comes especially in the Court’s 
discussion of whether the process under the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, relying on review by a Federal Court judge, allowed for 
review by “an independent and impartial magistrate”. The Court 
concluded that the process satisfied this component of the requirement 
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for a fair hearing (although it did not satisfy the component of a decision 
based on all relevant facts and law) on the basis that judges of the 
Federal Court can and do conduct a searching review of the state’s 
claims. In doing so, however, the Court framed its conclusion in 
lukewarm terms, saying that “a non-deferential role for the designated 
judge goes some distance toward alleviating the first concern, that the 
judge will be perceived to be in the camp of the government”.40 This 
conveys at least a residual concern that the judge’s position in a closed 
proceeding entails a troubling dependence on the executive. 
In fact, regardless of their commitment to doing so, judges 
frequently are not well equipped to carry out a reliably thorough review 
of the executive’s claims in closed proceedings. To borrow a phrase used 
to describe the past role of the Federal Court in security certificate 
proceedings, judges are reliant on the executive in their ability to 
“closely examine the information to look for the presence or absence of 
corroboration, and carefully scrutinize the credibility of human sources”,41 
because the use of secret evidence entails a decision by the executive to 
put forward some but not all the confidential information it holds and to 
present the evidence it does advance in ways that support the state’s 
case. This handicap is inherent to closed proceedings in the security field 
because, by definition, the evidence that must be presented secretly has 
originated in places that are also closely guarded from outside scrutiny; 
dependency is the unavoidable outcome of restricted access. Whether 
this poses insurmountable obstacles for the adjudicator in a specific 
proceeding depends in part on the executive’s claims and the nature of 
the evidence advanced to support them. Without vetting the informational 
base, however, it will be very difficult for a court to know with any 
confidence whether the case is indeed one in which the executive has 
something to hide. 
To emphasize the intractability of this dependency, let us consider 
the use of secret evidence of an intelligence report that is received from a 
foreign government subject to a commitment by the receiving state on 
the promise it be kept confidential. Such foreign-sourced information 
presents a special quandary. Faced with it, a court must scrutinize not 
only its own agencies but also those of the foreign government that 
supplied the report and the ultimate human or technical sources on which 
the report is based. In reviewing the role of each actor, and there are 
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many at play, the court must assess whether information was passed on 
erroneously, whether relevant material was withheld at some point in the 
chain of information-sharing, whether unreliable or unacceptable methods 
of interrogation or surveillance were utilized, whether the foreign 
government or the ultimate source may have an interest to deceive the 
receiving state or the court for its own ends, and so on. However, in 
pursuing this assessment, it may be impossible for a court, or even its 
own state’s agencies, to know with any confidence how the foreign 
government acquired the information or whether it was filtered through 
other sources. The court has little if any power to look behind the 
information directly because the state that receives it has no coercive 
authority in the territory of the state or states in which the information 
was elicited and conveyed. Could one ever hope to discover the original 
message in a game of telephone by asking questions only of the final 
recipient of the call? 
With respect to Charkaoui, it is important to distinguish the 
limitations arising from dependency on the executive from those arising 
from the absence of the individual in order to evaluate alternative 
mechanisms that could be used to satisfy the requirement of minimal 
impairment under section 1. It is especially important, in light of Bill C-3, 
to clarify that a special advocate is likewise dependent on the executive 
to be forthcoming and accurate about the confidential information in its 
custody.42 Special advocates must look to the executive to disclose 
information that may undermine the state’s case, to characterize 
accurately the nature and relevance of the executive’s investigation, to 
engage in good faith information sharing with other governments, to 
insulate their use of confidential information from other interests of the 
state, to eschew unacceptable methods of information gathering, to 
reveal activities of an informer that undermine the informer’s credibility, 
to carry out internal review and fair redaction of materials for purposes 
of disclosure and to act to prevent unofficial leaks against the individual. 
A special advocate has no way to audit the executive by probing its files, 
by formulating a wider view of state investigations, or by inquiring more 
deeply into the reliability of foreign-sourced information. 
The presence of a special advocate thus makes it more likely that 
probing questions will be asked in closed proceedings, but it does 
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comparatively little to enhance the court’s ability to rely on the veracity 
and completeness of the answers given by the executive. The special 
advocate depends as much as the judge on the executive to account for 
the individual’s interest at each stage of the process, from the earliest 
delineation of lines of investigation, to the posing of questions to 
informers and foreign governments, to the selection of witnesses, to the 
presentation of evidence to the court, to the formulation of any public 
comment on the court’s ultimate decision. Moreover, special advocates 
are also more constrained in this respect than at least two other 
alternative mechanisms identified by the Court in Charkaoui, including 
review by SIRC and by the Arar Inquiry. Both of these alternatives 
allowed for an independent investigation to be conducted into the full 
record of confidential information that is held by the executive, based on 
the issuance of an order to produce relevant documents or require 
officials to testify under oath. Special advocates lack the same 
capability, nor is there any express authorization in Bill C-3 for a court 
to grant such authority to a special advocate or some other entity on a 
case-by-case basis. 
In the English case of Re MB, the nature of the special advocate’s 
dependency was elaborated more clearly by Sullivan J. of the High 
Court.43 The case involved the use of secret evidence to justify a decision 
by the U.K. Secretary of State under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005 to issue a non-derogating44 control order against an individual for 
suspected involvement in terrorism. As part of his decision in that case 
that the process for court review of the Secretary of State’s decision was 
not consistent with the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Sullivan J. made this comment 
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on the employment of special advocates to ameliorate the unfairness of 
closed proceedings: 
While the special advocate can explore, for example, whether the 
closed materials placed before the Secretary of State ignored any lines 
of inquiry which were obvious at that time and which should have been 
pursued … he is not required to examine what was actually known to 
the Secretary of State’s informant, the Security Service, or whether any 
of the closed material on which the Secretary of State based his 
suspicion was in fact true … In particular, the Special Advocate does 
not have a roving commission to ascertain whether there might be new 
exculpatory material, or whether, for example, viewed in the light of 
the respondent’s explanations which were not available to the 
Secretary of State, a different interpretation might be given to the 
closed material.45 
This statement elucidates the root dependency of special advocates 
(and judges) in closed proceedings. It is a dependency that stems from 
the foreclosure of any independent investigation (whether or not by the 
individual and his or her counsel) of the underlying base of information 
from which executive officials have selected the material put before the 
court. By this process of selection, the evidentiary record is shaped in a 
potentially one-sided way and it is tenuous to allow the detention of an 
individual based simply on the executive’s duty “to act in utmost good 
faith and … make full, fair and candid disclosure of the facts, including 
those that may be adverse to its interests”.46 In its decision to uphold the 
process of closed review (subsequently struck down by the Supreme 
Court of Canada) in Charkaoui, the Federal Court of Appeal made much 
of the court’s ability to review effectively the state’s case based, in 
significant part, on the good faith of the executive. However, without a 
meaningful prospect that the executive’s choices in framing the subject 
matter and evidentiary record of closed proceedings can be reviewed — 
via an independent audit that is at least as likely to reveal 
misrepresentation by the executive as would be the case in analogous 
open proceedings — it is doubtful that a judge can deliver a reliably 
thorough review, even when the court is assisted by a special advocate. 
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4. The Dynamic of Closed Proceedings  
A final aspect of closed proceedings in the security context is that 
unlike other proceedings (including other confidential proceedings) they 
may take on a dynamic that conditions or impels the judge, sometimes in 
subtle ways, to favour the position of the executive over that of the 
individual and, more broadly, over the administration of justice. This 
conditioning of the adjudicator is in part the outcome of the various sets 
of limitations already discussed — absence of the individual and the 
public, and dependence on the executive — which also contribute to the 
creation of an adjudicative environment in which security concerns are 
allocated a privileged status because of their more direct and enabled 
representation before the court. Besides this, however, the courts may 
lean toward the executive’s position for more diffuse reasons arising 
from the dynamic of the proceedings itself and from the nature of the 
issues that are likely to arise in the security field.47 
Let us first consider the atmosphere and dynamic of closed 
proceedings. Other than the judge and a handful of court staff, the 
hearings will be attended by government counsel, government witnesses 
and government observers. The executive’s presence looms large before 
the judge, physically and psychologically, serving as a steady and highly 
visible reminder of the state’s overarching interest. This need not 
influence the judge such that he or she consciously decides that 
executive priorities should crowd out other concerns. But it can create 
home field advantage for the state in terms of the atmosphere of the 
hearing room and it will put more pressure on the judge who seeks 
actively to question the state’s claims. Closed proceedings are 
necessarily a bunkered space, reflecting the security realm in general, 
populated by those whose mission is to identify and counter threats and 
whose training and working life understandably presses in favour of 
secrecy over the need to disclose confidential information (or abandon a 
legal claim) in order to respect the integrity of adjudication.  
The challenge springs to a large extent from the significance and 
sheer complexity of evaluating secret evidence, predicting how its 
release could harm security, weighing this risk against the importance of 
openness and fairness (or of allowing the state’s legal case to proceed), 
devising ways to maximize disclosure without allowing the minutiae of 
document review to overwhelm the process, and regulating compliance 
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with orders to release information. In examining these questions, the 
courts must be acutely sensitive to the difficulties faced by the security 
agencies. They must scrupulously avoid the danger of “unnecessary and 
amateurish interference”48 given that a single ill-timed disclosure can 
destroy years of work and planning. On the other hand, the courts must 
also not be over-awed; judges, as Narain put it, “ought not to panic at the 
mere mention of national security and abdicate their inherent power in 
common law”.49 It is the courts that have the expertise and the ultimate 
duty to ensure that the magnetic attraction of national security does not 
lead to an erosion of legal principles, outside of situations of genuine 
national emergency.50 A security agency does not have the expertise 
required to avoid and manage the dangers that secrecy brings to 
adjudicative decision-making, and its views as to whether and how a rule 
or principle should be altered in order to facilitate closed proceedings on 
security grounds will naturally be affected by its responsibilities to 
counter security threats. 
Yet in the security context, especially in closed proceedings, the 
courts are encumbered by a well-recognized lack of relevant expertise 
and capability,51 explaining much of the courts’ tendency to accept 
executive appeals for deference in this area.52 Security concerns, 
including the implications of releasing confidential information, are 
often extraordinarily multi-faceted, requiring careful vigilance and 
frequent re-assessment, and the nature of security threats will be much 
clearer to those officials who have a dedicated and focused mandate to 
protect security. It would be exceedingly difficult, if not simply 
unrealistic, to expect a judge to be well versed in the full panoply of 
threats from diverse organizations and countries, and how best to 
respond to them. The issues may range from the novelty of investigative 
techniques, to the effectiveness of data-mining software, to the 
conditions of a witness’ imprisonment in a foreign country, to the 
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motivations of a foreign agency to share information, to the immutability 
of caveats, and so on.53 More broadly, the terrain of inquiry in national 
security has an especially opaque and high stakes quality in that the 
threats are often not very clear to anyone, including the security agencies, 
and yet are easily recognized as carrying potentially catastrophic 
consequences. 
This context for decision-making has the potential to amplify a 
judge’s sense of inadequacy and unpreparedness to overrule the 
executive in security matters. Faced with the complexity and urgency of 
the security interest, a judge may accept the state’s claims in part 
because he or she is not positioned to generate a credible alternative 
from his or her own knowledge and expertise. It may appear futile or 
hazardous, in particular, for the judge to attempt to determine the 
outcome of a decision to disclose confidential information after 
balancing the various interests that call for disclosure or for secrecy. 
This points to the difficulty of relying on judges alone to address all of 
the factual and legal dilemmas that arise where the state brings a claim 
against an individual based on secret evidence. Designating judges who 
have a background in national security to sit in such cases may enhance 
a court’s ability to scrutinize effectively the state’s evidence and 
argument (while also raising questions of impartiality) but it is not a 
substitute for the systematic acquisition of dedicated knowledge and 
expertise over years of focused and comprehensive work on the 
assessment of security concerns. This first element of the dynamic of 
closed proceedings, then, is the positioning of the judge in an 
environment that is dominated by representatives of the security interest 
and that requires the judge, in order to ensure accuracy and fairness in 
the process, to be prepared to reject the executive’s characterization of 
complex factual and expert evidence which itself demands great 
deference in light of security threats. 
Added to this is the opportunity for the executive to pit the 
complexities and uncertainties of national security interest against the 
judge’s ability to maximize disclosure to the individual and to the public. 
A judge will only be able to decide that confidential information can be 
released, over the arguments of the executive, after a time consuming 
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and probably testing interaction with executive officials in secret.54 The 
process may begin with an inquiry by the court into the various pieces of 
information in question and the rationales for secrecy in each case; with 
the executive called upon to elaborate its position on the various 
rationales advanced for secrecy — the protection of informers, the 
protection of investigative interests, the honouring of caveats to foreign 
states — and how each rationale plays out with respect to different units 
of fact or evidence that the executive seeks to withhold. As well, to the 
extent that any secrecy is permissible in the relevant legal context, 
consideration will need to be given to the different methods available to 
enable disclosure, to the extent possible, including the release of an 
adequate portion or summary of the evidence.55 Where the evidence as a 
whole is voluminous, the court may elect to reach decisions about 
disclosure in terms of classes rather than individual items of information, 
in which case the court’s decisions will then need to be applied to the 
precise language of relevant documents, transcripts, recordings and so on. 
Thus, the review of the state’s confidentiality claims in a closed 
proceeding is detailed and laborious. It calls for the meticulous study, 
vetting, and classification of the alleged facts, other information 
produced by the executive, and other relevant information not uncovered 
or produced by the executive (such as media reports). Myriad factual and 
legal issues will arise as proposed rationales for secrecy are applied to 
different subject matter. The relationship between the reasons for and 
against disclosure may well be fluid, requiring ongoing review as 
knowledge of the risks evolves or as additional information finds its way 
onto the public record (whether by official release, government leaks, 
whistle blowing, or otherwise).56 The process can be infuriatingly 
cumbersome and complex, all the more so where the executive 
encourages the unfolding of a contest of attrition in which the judge is 
disadvantaged.57 Moreover, the judge has a responsibility to resolve the 
case within a reasonable time frame, a responsibility of which the 
executive will be aware and able to exploit. The danger is that the judge, 
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sitting in secret and facing a daunting struggle with the executive, will 
over time be deterred from undertaking the exhaustive review that is 
required to tailor release in the interests of maximum disclosure and, by 
extension, accuracy and fairness.58 Thus, the dynamic of closed 
proceedings may prompt the judge to choose secrecy over disclosure as a 
practical option to contend with a seemingly endless stream of security 
concerns. Where the court’s sails begin to tack in this direction, who 
other than the executive will see the change? 
On the dynamic of closed proceedings, the Court in Charkaoui does 
not elaborate concerns along the lines of the issues discussed here. 
Indeed, the Court rejects the argument that the circumstances of closed 
proceedings “may give rise to a perception” that the judge “may not be 
entirely independent and impartial as between the state and the person 
named”59 on the basis that Federal Court judges do not adopt an overly 
deferential approach and may be said to possess relative expertise over 
the minister (although not, presumably, other security officials) on the 
matters at issue. Thus, the Court found that, although the judge is “the 
only person capable of providing the essential judicial component of the 
process” and although the hearing may take place “with only the judge 
and the government lawyers in the room”, this was not inconsistent with 
the requirements of independence and impartiality in a fair judicial 
process.60 Even so, as noted earlier, the Court was somewhat circumspect 
in its concluding statement on this point that “a non-deferential role for 
the designated judge goes some distance toward alleviating the first 
concern, that the judge will be perceived to be in the camp of the 
government”.61 These statements suggest that the Court, even if it saw a 
possibility for the dynamic of closed proceedings to favour the state’s 
interest, it was not so troubled by this possibility as to found a violation 
of section 7 on this limitation alone. 
Further, the appointment of a special advocate will make an 
important difference in counteracting this limitation arising from the use 
of secret evidence. His or her presence allows someone other than the 
judge to bear the burden of confronting the state, thus reducing concerns 
that the judge might otherwise be deterred by the complexity and 
uncertainty of national security or otherwise shy away from an 
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exhausting battle with the executive over disclosure. The special 
advocate is there to emphasize the individual’s interests where the 
executive prefers them to be suppressed, and to check the judge from 
becoming too hesitant or comfortable in his or her working relationship 
with the executive’s counsel and witnesses. Appointment of a special 
advocate allows a clearer separation of the roles of judge and surrogate 
representative and provides an alternative to the pre-eminence of the 
executive in the hearing room. 
Even so, the dynamic of closed proceedings remains an important 
factor, especially when the court is dealing with a complex case 
involving a large amount of confidential information (including the 
underlying information base held by the executive). Special advocates 
are, like judges, unlikely to have the specialized knowledge and 
expertise that is required to counter the executive’s position in the 
intricacies of national security, and are also vulnerable to obstruction and 
exhaustion in the contest of attrition over the state’s confidentiality 
claims.62 Unlike in other proceedings, special advocates are precluded 
from turning to colleagues for advice on factual or legal issues that arise 
unexpectedly after a case is underway. They cannot access outside 
expertise or investigative resources, and are limited in their ability to 
develop their own expertise or assemble evidence in a systematic way as 
the process unfolds.63 The special advocate’s ability to counter possible 
tendencies in favour of secrecy and security thus depends not only on his 
or her dedication to advocate relentlessly for the individual, but also on 
his or her access to additional resources, including administrative and 
research support. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In Charkaoui, the Court adopted a qualified position against secret 
evidence. It referred to the need to rely on confidential information, and 
withhold evidence from the individual in immigration detention cases, as 
a “reality of our modern world”.64 It also emphasized that the Charter 
does not require a system of ideal procedural fairness, but rather one that 
minimally impairs the rights of the individual. The Court accepted the 
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need for accommodation even where a person’s liberty is at stake65 in 
order to meet “the imperative of the protection of society”.66 Yet the 
Court also applied constitutional controls on secret evidence as required 
to satisfy “the basic principles that underlie our notions of justice and 
fair process”.67 It required the state to justify closed proceedings under 
section 1 of the Charter, and declined to incorporate security priorities as 
a balancing factor within the concept of fundamental justice under 
section 7. Further, the Court identified clearly a number of serious 
limitations arising in adjudication when the individual is denied access 
to the evidence, and clarified that relying on a judge alone to scrutinize 
the state’s case is insufficient for a fair process. This set the groundwork 
for the Court’s discussion of procedural adaptations to counter these 
limitations, including the appointment of special advocates. 
On the other hand, the Court was less attentive to other adjudicative 
weaknesses following from secret evidence, including the difficulties of 
countering the executive’s expertise due to the systemic absence of the 
public, the prospect that a judge may be influenced to favour secrecy and 
security in the face of the complexities and uncertainties of security 
threats or in the contest of attrition with the executive over disclosure. 
Most critically, the Court suggests, but does not elaborate on, a concern 
that the judge is entirely dependent on the executive’s good faith in its 
selection and depiction of secret evidence from other relevant 
information over which the executive may have custody. Moreover, 
some of these additional limitations, especially dependency on the 
executive, apply to special advocates as well as judges in closed 
proceedings. As such, the appointment of a special advocate in some 
respects simply redistributes the burden of acquiring countervailing 
expertise or resisting dependency to another actor who is as ill equipped 
and vulnerable as the judge. Put differently, it is not enough to ask 
whether special advocates can sufficiently compensate for the absence of 
the individual from closed proceedings (even if they can never address 
this weakness completely). One must also consider whether they, as well 
as the judge, have access to credible expertise to rival that of the security 
agencies and whether there exists a meaningful prospect for the full 
record held by the executive to be reviewed independently. In these 
respects, some of the other mechanisms discussed by the Court in 
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Charkaoui, namely review by SIRC or by a commission of inquiry, are 
better equipped than special advocates because of their ability to access 
institutionalized expertise and because of their statutory powers of 
investigation.68 
Other instruments may be available to courts to strengthen their 
review capacity or that of special advocates. Courts can look to outside 
expertise to counter the executive’s pre-eminence in security matters by 
appointing friends of the court, temporary advisors, or special masters, 
for example.69 The Federal Court in particular can appoint expert counsel 
to attend closed hearings and offer advice alongside that of the 
executive.70 In the United Kingdom, panels of the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission normally include a member who has worked in the 
security agencies and has relevant expertise. These measures differ from 
appointment of a special advocate in that they do not aim to compensate 
for the individual’s absence, but rather for the lack of a well-informed 
security perspective other than that of the security agencies. In 
themselves, however, these measures are a partial step because they are 
ad hoc and case specific, and thus limited in their potential to provide 
compelling and up-to-date advice. 
Another option is to establish a standing body tasked with developing 
independent expertise on matters of national security confidentiality. The 
role of such a body — let us call it an independent advisory body — 
would be to support the courts in cases where the executive proposed to 
rely on secret evidence to support a claim that an individual poses a 
security threat. The body might also be called on to generate proposals 
for the redaction or summarizing of evidence in closed proceedings, or 
to organize contentious documents in order to identify representative 
material for in-depth review by the court and by a special advocate.71 In 
this respect, the body would allow the courts to avoid getting bogged 
down in the myriad options for disclosure of individual items of 
evidence, and thus to insulate themselves from the potential contest of 
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attrition. On matters of security confidentiality generally, the body could 
offer a detached perspective on the use and reliability of secret evidence, 
and on the appropriateness of secrecy in different legal contexts. As a 
standing body, it could develop as a repository of specialized expertise 
in matters of security confidentiality which the courts and special 
advocates could call on as they saw fit, including expertise on whether 
and how to disclose different types of information in different legal 
contexts. The body would be in a stronger position than the courts or 
special advocates, or amicus curiae and temporary advisors, to acquire a 
broad view on security confidentiality, for instance via systematic 
research on policies and practices in different jurisdictions. It would, as 
such, lessen the tendency toward undue deference that arises from 
dependence on the executive, by allowing courts to hear well-informed 
advice that is highly credible, when put alongside those of the executive, 
because it originates in an established body and, importantly, because it 
is segregated from the executive’s conflict of interest in hidden government. 
Even so, neither a special advocate nor an independent advisory 
body addresses satisfactorily the weaknesses arising from dependence on 
the executive. To do so, these entities would require the ability to look 
behind executive claims by auditing the full record that is accessible to 
the state. In the security context, there is a unique need for investigative 
audits of this sort because of the degree to which executive claims turn 
on material that is not, and often will never be, on the public record. To 
be effective, such investigations would require backing by the coercive 
authority of the courts. Given this reliance on the courts’ authority, and 
the need to protect against overuse, such investigations should be 
authorized by the court subject to a specific mandate that focuses on 
issues of concern in the case at hand. The purpose of an investigation 
would not be to disprove the state’s case, but to examine security-related 
facts or issues that are significantly in dispute between the executive and 
either the special advocate or the individual. These might involve the 
completeness of disclosure, the reliability of information produced, the 
admissibility of foreign-sourced information, and so on. 
Again, the objective is not to preclude the use of secret evidence 
outright even if in some contexts its use will indeed be irreparably 
unsafe and unfair. The aim is rather to facilitate adjudicative review that 
minimizes the risks of error arising from secret evidence, and offers 
robust checks against abuse, by employing well-tailored procedural 
adaptations. Where viable mechanisms exist to strengthen the capacity 
of the courts for effective review of secret evidence, those mechanisms 
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should be put in place, above all where a fundamental right or freedom is 
at stake, as it was in Charkaoui. Likewise, the full range of limitations 
arising from secret evidence should be identified and assessed carefully 
in order to inform the design of these procedures to guard against the 
inherent sacrifice of accuracy and fairness. If governments elect to put 
forward secret evidence and if, in doing so, they rely on the courts to 
deliver the requisite checks, then they should be required also to equip 
the courts properly for the task. 
IV. POSTSCRIPT 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s second Charkaoui decision72 was 
released shortly after this article was completed. The decision is 
significant because its reasoning acknowledges and seeks to address 
certain limitations arising from the use of secret evidence that relates to 
the interview notes of Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) 
officials and especially from the unique dependency of judges on the 
executive in closed proceedings. 
The relevant facts of this second Charkaoui decision were as 
follows. The security certificate issued by two ministers against Mr. 
Charkaoui pursuant to section 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act in May 2003 led to his arrest and detention until February 
2005, when Noel J. of the Federal Court authorized Mr. Charkaoui’s 
conditional release following a fourth review of his detention. Prior to 
this fourth review, government counsel revealed to the judge that a 
document that should have been disclosed to Mr. Charkaoui in May 
2003 had not been disclosed because of an oversight. The document was 
a summary of two CSIS interviews with Mr. Charkaoui in 2002. 
After receiving a summary of the information, Mr. Charkaoui 
requested disclosure of the complete notes and recordings of the CSIS 
interviews. The government replied that there were no recordings in the 
file and that notes of CSIS interviews are, according to CSIS policy, 
systematically destroyed once the CSIS officers complete their reports. 
In light of this, Mr. Charkaoui applied for a stay of proceedings and 
requested that the security certificate against him be quashed. Justice 
Noel dismissed the application, noting that CSIS was not a police agency 
and that it was not subject to the disclosure duties of a police force under 
criminal law. This decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal. 
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The Supreme Court allowed Mr. Charkaoui’s appeal in part. It found 
that CSIS breached its duty to retain and disclose information pursuant 
to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.73 It found also that 
existing case law on the disclosure and retention of information under 
section 7 of the Charter required CSIS to retain all the information in its 
possession relating to security certificate investigations and to disclose 
that information to the relevant ministers and to the designated judge. 
It was argued in the present article that, in a closed proceeding, the 
judge is uniquely dependent on the executive to characterize and select 
information that is introduced as secret evidence. The judge is not in a 
position (nor is the individual, of course) to review the full record of 
information held by the executive. As a result, greater opportunity for 
error or abuse on the part of the executive arises than would be the case 
if an extensive disclosure duty applied or if expanded opportunities for 
independent investigation of the underlying record were available. In 
Charkaoui, these concerns were exacerbated by the fact that the original 
interview notes were destroyed and no recordings made, requiring the 
judicial review process to rely only on interview summaries prepared by 
CSIS officials. 
These concerns were acknowledged, and steps were taken to address 
them, in the reasons of LeBel and Fish JJ. for the Court. First, it was 
concluded that CSIS’s policy to destroy original interview notes violated 
the CSIS Act and that such notes are “a better source of information, and 
of evidence, when they are submitted to the ministers responsible for 
issuing a security certificate and to the designated judge who will 
determine whether the certificate is reasonable”.74 Retention of the notes 
would “make it easier to verify the disclosed summaries and information 
based on those notes”.75 Notably, LeBel and Fish JJ. observed that CSIS 
was criticized in an earlier decision of the Security Intelligence Review 
Committee (“SIRC”)76 after a report submitted to SIRC by the Department 
of Foreign Affairs was found to be inaccurate and misleading because 
information provided by CSIS had been inaccurate and incomplete. 
Justices LeBel and Fish cited this statement from paragraph 72 of the 
SIRC decision: 
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The issue of what was said during security screening interviews is a 
perennial source of argument in the course of the Review Committee’s 
investigation of complaints. Complainants frequently allege that the 
investigator’s report of their interview is not accurate: that their answers 
are incomplete, or have been distorted or taken out of context.77 
Second, LeBel and Fish JJ. concluded that, although CSIS was not a 
police agency, it was subject to a duty of disclosure going beyond mere 
summaries of information relevant to security certificate proceedings. 
Such proceedings were not criminal trials but, given that “[t]he 
consequences of security certificates are often more severe than those of 
many criminal charges”, the procedural fairness requirements under 
section 7 required “a procedure for verifying the evidence adduced 
against [the individual]”78 centring on review by the designated judge. 
According to LeBel and Fish JJ.: 
… If the original evidence was destroyed, the designated judge has 
access only to summaries prepared by the state, which means that it 
will be difficult, if not impossible, to verify the allegations. … 
As things stand, the destruction by CSIS officers of their 
operational notes compromises the very function of judicial review. To 
uphold the right to procedural fairness of people in Mr. Charkaoui’s 
position, CSIS should be required to retain all the information in its 
possession and to disclose it to the ministers and the designated judge. 
The ministers and the designated judge will in turn be responsible for 
verifying the information they are given. …79 
Lastly, LeBel and Fish JJ. linked these findings to the Court’s conclusion 
regarding closed proceedings in the first Charkaoui decision, that 
“[d]espite the judge’s best efforts to question the government’s witnesses 
and scrutinize the documentary evidence, he or she is placed in the 
situation of asking questions and ultimately deciding the issues on the 
basis of incomplete and potentially unreliable information”.80 This 
supports the view expressed in the present article that the first Charkaoui 
decision also acknowledges, even if only implicitly, the unique 
dependency of the judge on executive officials in closed proceedings and 
the corresponding weaknesses of adjudication in the face of secret 
evidence. 
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